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On 18 December 2018, Magistrats Européens pour la Démocratie et les Libertés
(MEDEL) announced that it had sent a letter to the European Commission in which
it raised concern about the lack of independence of the Bulgarian judiciary, naming
inter alia the “recurrent pressures” faced by the President of Bulgaria’s Supreme
Court of Cassation. 
While focusing on other EU members facing challenges in the area of rule of
law, foreign commentators may not realize that the situation in Bulgaria is critical.
Bulgaria’s executive is now headed into the homestretch of capturing the entire
justice system. The current unprecedented proceedings against the President of
the Supreme Court of Cassation would complete the capture if the plan that shows
through – remove him from office – works.
The Homestretch
On 14 December 2018, Bulgaria’s Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) initiated
unprecedented proceedings against the President of the Supreme Court of
Cassation Lozan Panov to establish if he had threatened judicial independence.
To those who follow the downfall of Bulgaria’s rule of law, the goal is clear. Under
Article 129(3)(5) of Bulgaria’s Constitution, the President of the Supreme Court of
Cassation can be impeached if they undermined the reputation of the justice system
– threatening judicial independence fits this hypothesis. 
For a Western observer, the circumstances, which led to these proceedings,
may appear absurd. On 28 November 2018, pursuant to Article 114(9) of the
Law on the Judiciary, Lozan Panov launched an inquiry following public doubts
about administrative malpractice by the Specialized Criminal Court of Appeal. The
inquiry established that the Specialized Criminal Court of Appeal had quashed
a ruling by the lower Specialized Criminal Court, without having the protocol of
the sitting and before the ruling was even signed by the judicial panel – a distinct
case of administrative malpractice. What is striking about the circumstances is
that Bulgaria’s prosecution publicly instructed the Specialized Criminal Court of
Appeal not to cooperate with the Supreme Court of Cassation, which is a violation
of the hierarchy of the justice system enshrined in the Constitution. While the
Specialized Criminal Court of Appeal provided the necessary documents to the
Supreme Court of Cassation at the end, they sent a letter of complaint to the SJC,
asking them to establish if the inquiry into their administration constituted institutional
pressure.
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At the SJC sitting of 14 December 2018, Lozan Panov was fiercely attacked by
members known for their dependence on the executive. Subsequently, with 7 votes
in favor of proceedings, the judicial college of the SJC referred the matter to the
Judicial Inspectorate – SJC’s division, which is competent to examine such cases.
Many fear that these proceedings are the beginning of the latest large-scale attempt
to remove Panov from office.
Years of Abuse
This has not been the first attack on the President of the Supreme Court of
Cassation. Rather, he has been subject to shocking harassment since he announced
his candidacy for this position in 2014. While he has been extremely vocal about
this in public, these incidents have not been included in Bulgaria’s reports under
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). In fact, in 2018 these attacks
intensified, but the European Commission provisionally closed the “judicial
independence” benchmark, thus demonstrating not only denial of reality, but also
complicity with Bulgaria’s executive.
In 2014, when running for President of the Supreme Court of Cassation, Lozan
Panov was hit by a car in mysterious circumstances. In the first year of his
appointment (2015), he was already talking about overt pressure by the executive:
“We need to fight with all strength, we have to ensure that the court has the degree
of independence which is necessary to promote the rule of law … Say no to fear!”
In 2017, masked men recreated a dreadful scene from The Godfather when Panov
was entering the SJC building. In the same year, the car bolts of his official state
car were found to be loosened, but the Prosecutor’s Office refused to investigate
what to many appeared to be an attempt on his life, or at least a serious threat.
The prosecution argued the bolts loosened by themselves – a laughable statement
dispelled by the producer of the car, Mercedes, themselves. In 2018, Panov
publicly complained the abuses had transferred onto his family because he kept
refusing to execute political orders. 
Talks of impeachment escalated after Panov gave a powerful speech about why
the judicial system in Bulgaria was not independent, at a MEDEL conference
in November 2018, shortly after Bulgaria’s latest CVM report came out. Pro-
government media and politicians from the status quo accused him of talking like a
politician, which, in their opinion, was inadmissible. Of course, this attack is ironic
considering that complaining from pressure by the executive is compatible with
Bulgaria’s Constitution, which recognizes the judiciary as independent and enshrines
the right to free speech and opinion(Article 117(2) and Article 39). Moreover, Article
2(2) of MEDEL’s Statutes explicitly specifies “the defense of the independence of
the judiciary in the face of every other power as well as of specific interests” as one
of the goals of the organization – as highlighted above, the speech was given at a
MEDEL event. 
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Thorn in the Side of the Status Quo
Essentially, the Supreme Court of Cassation is the only institution, which needs to be
conquered before completing the capture of Bulgaria’s justice system. Here is why:
• Omnipotent and politically-dependent Prosecutor’s Office
Bulgaria’s Prosecutor’s Office is often described as “Soviet” because it has not been
reformed since communism. It has an entirely vertical structure with no checks and
balances, which allow its misuse for political aims, including political persecutions.
In 2016, the President of the Venice Commission argued: “The Soviet model of the
prosecution must be decisively turned down. It turns it into a source of corruption
and blackmail and creates opportunities for its use for political aims.” In Kolevi v
Bulgaria, the European Court of Human Rights emphasized that Bulgaria was the
only country in the Council of Europe, which had endorsed a vertical model, without
checks and balances. In other words, all decisions – whether to start or close an
investigation, whether to indict someone, etc. – depend on the Prosecutor General
who is traditionally faithful to the government. 
In communist times, the prosecution was considered more important than the court
because it was the mouthpiece of the regime. Hence, Bulgaria’s criminal law is
skewed in its favor – the prosecution has a monopoly and complete procedural
control of the investigation process and the pre-trial phase, and disproportionate
powers at the trial stage. Bulgaria has lost hundreds of casesfor violations of Article
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights on similar facts. Instead of making
amendments, which bring Bulgarian law in line with the European Convention
on Human Rights and enforce the principle of the equality of arms in criminal
proceedings, Bulgaria’s government carried out a number of reforms, which further
limited the rights of accused people and made it almost impossible to challenge
procedural violations in local courts.
Sadly, it appears that the European Commission did not take into account the
complexity of these unfortunate developments. Because of the 2017 amendments to
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the European Commission declaredthe benchmark
“legal framework” under the CVM provisionally closed. The irony is that these
amendments were deemed anti-constitutionalin public statements by the Supreme
Court of Cassation, the Association of Bulgarian Judges and tens of NGOs. They
seem to violate the European Convention on Human Rights, too. 
• Parallel court system (extraordinary tribunals): 
Encouraged by the European Commission, in 2009, Boyko Borissov’s first
government pushed for amendments in the Law on the Judiciary to create the
Specialized Criminal Court, which acts as a first-instance and a second-instance
of appeal. The institution, which was loosely modeled after the Criminal Chamber
of Audiencia Nacional in Spain, started functioning in 2011. At the time, judges,
politicians from the opposition, and human rights activists raised concern that there
was a high risk of violations of fundamental rights. Commentators emphasized
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that Audiencia Nacionalhas been criticized in Spain, but has not undergone EU
scrutiny (See Y Kuzmova, ‘The Bulgarian Specialized Criminal Court after One
Year: A Misplaced Transplant, an Instrument of Justice, or a Tool of Executive
Power?’ (2014) 32 Boston University International Law Journal 228, pp 245-61).
Bulgaria’s Specialized Criminal Court has many of the features of an extraordinary
tribunal – it has competences by virtue of the profession/personality of the indicted
person rather than the crime (for instance, a judge), its procedural rules differ in
certain aspects from those of ordinary courts, its existence was justified with the
argument of “necessity,” etc. Civil society members have also raised concern
about the manner in which the judges in this court were selected – many of them
are former prosecutors. Indoctrinated with the culture of Bulgaria’s Prosecutor’s
Office, they are less sensitive to fundamental rights. Moreover, as seen above, the
prosecution feels confident to even publicly tell judges from this court what they
should do. 
While the European Commission has praised Bulgaria for setting up this specialized
court in its CVM reports, many civil society members have condemned it. Essentially,
the specialized courts rival the regular criminal chambers in Bulgaria’s court system,
thus constituting a parallel court system, and have become a venue for harassment
of inconvenient opponents of the government. 
In light of the above, the Supreme Court of Cassation is problematic for the
Prosecutor’s Office and the executive – as a final instance of appeal, it can overturn
decisions by the Specialized Criminal Court of Appeal. This may also explain why
the Prosecutor’s Office was extremely irritated that Lozan Panov initiated an inquiry
into the administrative malpractices of the Specialized Criminal Court of Appeal, and
why the political status quo wants the highest-ranking judge eliminated. 
• Politically-dependent SJC:
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) is the most important institution
in Bulgaria’s justice system. It is responsible for the appointment and promotion of
all magistrates (investigators, prosecutors, and judges) as well as for monitoring
their ethical values. It has been permanently torn by scandals evidencing corruption
and heavy dependence on the executive – see, for instance, Yaneva Gate. Instead
of encouraging a substantial reform of the SJC through the CVM, nonetheless, the
European Commission accepted Bulgaria’s cosmetic 2015 constitutional reform.
The 2016 CVM report on Bulgaria indicates that while the constitutional amendments
Bulgaria’s has made to address SJC’s shortcomings are not as extensive as initially
planned, “their adoption still represents an important step towards a reform of the
SJC.”
This reform did not curtail the political dependences of this institution in any way. To
clarify, following the alleged reform, 11 of SJC’s 25 members are directly elected by
Bulgaria’s Parliament whose main criterion, as visible from the candidates who were
elected, is the government-likability factor rather than their qualifications and ethical
standards. Boyan Magdalinchev, who subsequently became the Representative of
the SJC, had allegedly been implicated into a number of scandals concerning non-
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random distribution of case files and manipulation of judicial panels, but this did not
prevent the Parliament from electing him for the political quota, without an inquiry.
Moreover, 4 prosecutors and 1 investigator who are elected in the SJC are direct
subordinates of the General Prosecutor, who is an automatic member of the SJC. As
explained above, the prosecution is a mouthpiece of the executive. In other words,
the executive may exercise influence on most members of the body. 
The political dependencies of these people can be discerned in the way they vote
– in a prior article, I showcased how they asked the government how to vote on the
suspension of the Polish KRS in the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary
(ENJC), which is an anti-constitutional practice. In November 2018, there was a
major controversy about the appointment of the Head of the Sofia City Court, the
most important lower court based on its jurisdiction. Of course, one may discern a
political motivation in the recent attack against the President of the Supreme Court
of Cassation, too. If he gets eliminated with SJC’s help, the SJC can appoint a more
“likable” and obedient judge in his place, given the current status quo. 
Critical Times
In conclusion, Bulgaria’s executive is on the verge of completing its capture of
the justice system. Meanwhile, the European Commission considers the judiciary
independent in spite of the fact that Bulgarian high-ranking judges publicly complain
from unacceptable pressure, and reputable organizations and civil society members
raise concern that the situation is critical. 
Could it be that somebody else has already completed the capture of the European
Commission itself? While it has become fashionable to refer to Euro elections
2019 as a possible remedy to shatter the status quo at an EU level, Bulgaria may
be a fully consolidated autocracy by the time the next European Commission is
appointed. 
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